What Would a Humanistic DSM-V Look Like? -Andrew Bland

A HUMANISTIC DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM
Now I will provide some examples of key texts that form a basis for describing mental disorders from a humanistic angle while maintaining the structure of the current diagnostic system. (Vintage, 1986, third edition) , and Kirk Schneider's ExistentialIntegrative Psychotherapy (Routledge, 2008) provide accounts of the succession from more healthy (e.g., constructive anxiety, phase of life problems, mild adjustment disorders) to less healthy (from anxiety to mood to psychotic disorders) on Axis I. May emphasized that there is "good" and "bad" anxiety, in the same way that the physical body requires a balance of high HDL and low LDL cholesterol, and that the denial of anxiety and of struggle as vital and essential aspects of the human condition lends itself to dampened sensibility (i.e. depression). In T he title question was recently posted on a list-serve. Below is a composite summary of my responses. Th is is not intended as the fi nal word-but rather as a collection of gut impressions and working notes intended to disrupt fi xed systems of thinking and to inspire dialogue about diagnosis and classifi cation of mental health and suff ering in a way that is both clinically practical and sensitive to individuals' lived experience. My primary proposal is that a humanistic DSM-V already exists in raw form. I have included both classic and contemporary references for conceptualizing mental disorders through humanistic, existential, and transpersonal lenses.
REGARDING THE DSM
To preface my thoughts about a humanistic diagnostic system, fi rst I will identify a few assumptions.
First, the current DSM is necessary but insuffi cient. Diagnosis and classifi cation are not inherently problematic; incorporating diagnostic descriptions into sessions can be most validating of clients' phenomenological experience, affi rming and normalizing their existence and their human struggles. Rather, what I fi nd troublesome about the DSM is that its descriptions of surface conditions lend themselves to confusing the map for the territory, to limited therapeutic engagement, and therefore to the potential for poor practice outcomes.
Second, it is necessary (a) to ground a humanistic diagnostic system in language that is congruent and compatible with what is familiar to most conventional clinicians and to others who regularly utilize the DSM (e.g., managed care) and (b) to account both for conventional reality and the client's reality without favoring one at the expense of the other.
Th ird, oversimplifi cation should be avoided, and dimensionality and complexity embraced. (It was the desire for parsimony in the development of the DSM that got us in this mess in the fi rst place!) Th e detached stance of the current and previous DSMs should be replaced with more compassionate I-Th ou verbiage that promotes human dignity, that emphasizes the whole person in context, and that promotes clients' freedom in and responsibility for their conditions.
[People's] inner nature is in part unique to [themselves] and in part species-wide.
-Abraham Maslow addition, as a guide for addressing concerns about cultural bias in the DSM, May identifi ed numerous biological and cultural issues that help diff erentiate between aspects of health and pathology that arise across cultures and generations and those that may be fl agged as facets of modern American cultural imperialism.
Frankl picked up where May left off , describing not only problematic anxiety as an existential crisis but also the further deterioration of the personality from inhibition (depression) into passivizing (psychosis).
May's and Frankl's ideas were further expanded upon in Schneider's conceptualization of mental disorders as imbalances along a continuum between dread of constriction to dread of expansion of one's energies and experiences-thereby accounting not only for anxiety and depression but also for mania and impulsiveness. His table of "Psychiatric Disorders and Th eir Associated Dreads" off ered a simple yet resonant phenomenological vocabulary for improving the current DSM diagnostic criteria as I suggested above (e.g., obssessivecompulsive disorder as "dread of experimentation, surprise, confusion, and complexity," p. 43).
Schneider (Wiley, 2003) provides compassionate accounts of how physical diseases can provide clues to specifi c areas of poor emotional coping. My only suggestion would be to add categories to Axis IV that account for existential and moral/spiritual crises; for mesolevel cultural concerns; and for barriers to value systems, to creativity, and to other human potentials.
Axis V
Ken Wilber proposed an integral psychograph consisting of fi ve developmental lines-cognitive, aff ective, spiritual, interpersonal, and moral-that follow a similar pattern of holonic development (see Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Th erapy, Shambhala, 2000, p. 30 ). An accurate portrayal of individuals' growth in each of these domains would resemble a series of sliders on a stereo equalizer to depict their levels of maturity in each area, with some levels tending to be more evolved than others. Such a multidimensional system would provide a richer sense of context to replace the oversimplifi ed Global Assessment of Functioning scale.
DEFINING PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH
A unique contribution that humanistic psychologists can make to the DSM-V would be an introductory outline of characteristics of psychological health, like Abraham Maslow and Bela Mittelmann used to lead off Principles of Abnormal Psychology: Th e Dynamics of Psychic Illness (Harper, 1951, revised edition) . In a future article, I will propose such a list, updated to include areas associated with self-actualizing and self-transcendence that Maslow proposed in his later writings.
A TEMPLATE
In this article I have suggested that the material for a humanistic DSM-V exists in raw form, and I have furnished some resources that could be woven into a cohesive narrative that appropriates and expands upon the existing DSM structure. For a model of what a fi nished product could look like, see the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organizations, 2006) , an adaptation of the DSM-IV by psychoanalysts.
CONCLUSION: IN BUT NOT OF
Th e DSM-I and -II had a psychoanalytic bent, which became replaced with a cognitive behavioral leaning in -III and -III-R. DSM-IV was intended to have no underlying theory (just research). It was assumed that value-free science would prevail and that clinicians could operate using whatever theoretical orientation they prefer to address symptoms. However, like it or not, the research that fueled this endeavor was theory-driven, and the meta-analysis studies that were favored for their alleged ability to show patterns across time often mixed and matched studies from eras when depression and other disorders had diff erent meanings at diff erent moments in the historical evolution of the DSM.
Th at said, I believe that a humanistic DSM-V could be a great gift in that, by default, humanistic psychology is inherently an integrative psychology. Since its emergence as the third force in the mid-20 th century, it has embraced the best of several orientations in the interest of clearing a space for additional areas of human existence and experience that had not been given due consideration by those orientations on their own. Moving this principle forward to today, this could be key to overcoming the sterility of the current DSM without moralizing, problematically pressing a political agenda, or reducing to a lowest common denominator. 
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